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Coalition Formation and the German Party System 
CHARLES LEES, Department of Politics, University of Sheffield (UK) 
 
ABSTRACT 
The article uses a thick synthetic analytical framework, derived from the established 
coalition literature to examine the process of coalition formation in the context of the 
German party system at the time of the 2009 federal election. It argues that increasing 
party system fragmentation and fluidity long term effects of the critical changes that 
took place between 1983 and the mid 1990s. These changes have shifted coalition 
power away from the smaller parties, and in particular the FDP, and towards the two 
Volksparteien. In terms of the coalition game, the article argues that outcomes cannot 
be explained by pure office-seeking but that these motives do become important once 
the desire to avoid unnecessary co-ordination costs, achieve ideological adjacency and 
reduce ideological range to a minimum has been satisfied. The article concludes by 
asserting that, rather than being a re-constitution of the default coalition model in 
Germany, the logic of the 2009 Black-Yellow coalition is consistent with more recent 
coalition games and therefore is a reflection of change rather than continuity. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Students of German politics greeted the start of election year in 2009 with a sense of 
anticipation. Opinion polls over the previous two years1 of the incumbent Grand 
coalition showed a decline in support for both government parties and one that was 
particularly steep for the SPD2. The polls indicated that an enforced change in the 
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composition of the government, although not inevitable, was very probable after 
federal elections on the 27th of September. 
The decline in support for the Grand coalition meant that a number of other 
coalition options became increasingly credible alternatives as the election approached. 
Because of the restrictions imposed by political parties on themselves, some coalition 
options – such as Social-Liberal (SPD-FDP)3, Red-Red (SPD-Left Party) and ‘Traffic Light’ 
(SPD-Greens-FDP) – had been either ruled out publically or were considered highly 
unlikely options. Nevertheless, at the start of 2009 there remained six politically 
feasible coalition options: a continuation of the Grand coalition (CDU/CSU-SPD), Black-
Yellow (CDU/CSU-FDP), Black-Green (CDU/CSU-Greens), ‘Jamaica’ (CDU/CSU-FDP-
Greens), Red-Green (SPD-Greens), and Red-Red-Green (SPD-Left Party-Greens). Black-
Green was considered the most likely alternative to the incumbent coalition. 
The outcome of the 2009 federal election did indeed result in a defeat for the 
Grand coalition. The smaller parties performed very well, with the FDP winning 93 
seats (up from 61 in 2005), the Left Party - formerly the PDS - 76 seats (up from 54 in 
2005) and the Greens 68 (up from 51 in 2005). This meant that the small parties now 
controlled 237 seats of the 622-seat Bundestag. The two Volksparteien, on the other 
hand, did less well. Within this context, the CDU/CSU’s seat share actually went up 
from 226 to 239 seats, despite winning only 33.8 per cent of the vote, down 1.4 per 
cent on the 2005 election. Compared to this, the SPD was, as expected, the high profile 
loser in the election, winning just 23 per cent of the vote, down 11.2 per cent from 
2005 and giving the party just 146 seats, down from 222 in 2005. 
At the start of October, the CDU/CSU and FDP commenced coalition 
negotiations and, on October 28th 2009, following the signing of a formal coalition 
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agreement between the parties, Angela Merkel was re-appointed Federal Chancellor 
at the head of the new Black-Yellow coalition. Compared to the formation of the Grand 
coalition four years earlier, the new Black-Yellow coalition was the obvious option 
given the distribution of party weights following the election and the lack of any 
obvious alternative options. Given this context, however, the length and difficulty of 
the subsequent coalition negotiations between the CDU/CSU and FDP took many by 
surprise and indicated that this was not a simple return to the tried-and-tested ‘Black-
Yellow model’ of the 1960s, 1980s, and 1990s. This article argues that the reasons for 
this lie in the changed dynamics of the German party system over the last thirty years. 
In doing so, the article also provides a re-examination of the context within which the 
formation of the Black Yellow coalition took place that throws light upon the logic of 
coalition formation more broadly in Germany. 
The rest of this article is structured as follows. First, I present a ‘thick’ synthetic 
framework to explain the process of coalition formation in 2009, derived from the 
established coalition literature. Second, the article maps the German party system in 
2009, with an emphasis on the historical context and the changing dynamics of party 
politics in the Federal Republic. Third, I assess the nature of the coalition game in 2009 
in the light of the changes that have taken place. Finally, the article concludes with a 
summary of the data and main arguments. 
 
SACRIFICING PARSIMONY FOR EXPLANATION: ANALYSING COALITION FORMATION IN 
GERMANY 
As noted above, this article deploys a thick synthetic framework to explain the process 
of coalition formation in Germany in 2009. The framework is still reasonably 
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abstracted and there is no reason why it could not be deployed in any ‘strong’ party 
system in which levels of party system fragmentation make coalition government 
necessary. However, it does not possess the elegance and parsimony of a ‘classic’ 
coalition model, is more explanatory than predictive and anyway is not, in the strictest 
sense, a model at all. 
The framework is premised on the assumption that the players of real-world 
coalition games are party elites but that their strategic calculus is subject to a bounded 
rationality imposed upon them by three factors. First, the players have imperfect 
information and the costs of processing that information is often high and sometimes 
beyond their capabilities. Second, there are significant institutional constraints 
imposed upon the players, not just in terms of the wider ‘rules of the game’ associated 
with – in this instance -German party politics, but also in terms of the beliefs, norms, 
and standard operating procedures (SOPs) associated with the political parties that 
they lead and the subsequent transaction costs associated with their influence on the 
game. Third, the players’ calculi are skewed by ‘pure time preference’, in which 
premiums are placed on payoffs accruing nearer in time and those that are more 
remote in time are discounted. Let us look at each of these in turn. 
The first point, about imperfect information and the costs associated with 
information processing, is an empirical objection to the common use of ‘core theory’4 
and the calculation of dimension-by-dimension medians5 or DDMs, in analysing 
players’ strategies during the process of coalition formation. Core-theoretical models 
are deployed to analyse the relative policy positions of political parties at T1 – 
immediately before or after the election6 - and seek to identify the ‘political heart’7 of 
players’ preference curves in n dimensional policy space. DDM approaches will often 
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focus on the period between T2 (the start of coalition negotiations) and the T3 (the 
signing of the formal coalition agreement or government declaration) and compare the 
‘latticing’8 of players’ initial preference curves as well as the positioning of the eventual 
government declaration in policy space. This retroductive process is a very powerful 
tool for, for instance, determining which party was most effective in making sure that 
its policy preferences were included in the eventual government declaration but is less 
convincing in inferring the relative power of parties at T1. This is because, as touched 
upon above, it is at least questionable to assume that players are cognitively capable9 
of making the sort of multi-dimensional calculus envisaged by these models; certainly 
not in the absence of the kind of analytical tools, such as ‘wordscore’ or’ wordfish’, 
that are deployed so effectively by political scientists to map such space10. Moreover, 
even if they did have this capacity it is hard to credit that they would be willing to incur 
the kind of deliberation costs that such multi-dimensional calculations would incur 
within complex party hierarchies11. 
This leads us to the second point, the constraining impact of the institutional 
context in which coalition players operate. As already noted, some of these relate to 
the rules of the game of German party politics and do not really need any substantive 
reiteration here12. Just as important are the beliefs, norms, and SOPs of the political 
parties that the players lead. Beliefs and norms are obvious constraints: for instance, 
the SPD’s scope for co-operation with the Greens in the 1980s and 1990s was 
restricted by widespread opposition within the party to a strategy of co-operation13, as 
is the party’s current room for manoeuvre with the Left Party14. Similarly, recent 
moves by CDU elites to co-operate with the Greens have not been universally 
welcomed by CDU members or voters15. Of course, elites also share a notion of what 
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conforms to a ‘logic of appropriateness’16 and often hold many of these beliefs 
themselves. However, the ‘curvilinear disparity’ between elite beliefs and those of 
mid-level cadre in particular is well documented17 and implies that some of these 
constraints are to all intents and purposes exogenous to the coalition game and as a 
result imposed upon players by an often recalcitrant party with the potential to 
sanction leaders when their strategic choices as players move away from the settled 
preferences (or indeed prejudices) of the parties they lead18. 
The impact of the constraints imposed by beliefs and norms is most obvious in 
the pre-election statements, described in the introduction to this article, that German 
party elites often issue prior to elections ruling out particular coalition arrangements 
19.More subtle and, from the perspective of this article, important are the impact of 
SOPs as a constraint upon the kind of multi-dimensional calculus discussed earlier. For 
even if, as already discussed, players were able to make complex multi-dimensional 
calculations at T1 the process by which one or more parties are able to reach their 
goal(s) at T3 changes the rules of the game profoundly. (Indeed, it would not be too 
strong to wonder whether the process after T1 is not a different game entirely). Here I 
draw upon a number of well-established studies of complex organisations that analyse 
how strategies are implemented from the initial decision phase to that of 
implementation20. The literature reveals that the process of formal negotiations 
involves trust-building through (a) delegating and monitoring on the part of the 
leadership and (b) formalising and scoping on the part of the party professionals 
tasked with bringing about the merger in practical terms21. Both of these processes 
involve a degree of risk-taking; for instance in coalition negotiations it may mean giving 
ground on an important policy objective or even giving way completely in the 
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allocation of a key policy portfolio. It is here, when parties become, as it were, 
‘preferred bidders’, that the kind of DDM analysis discussed above can come into its 
own, especially as the formalising and scoping process reduces the information and 
transaction costs involved and makes the kind of multi-dimensional calculations 
envisaged in these approaches a little less costly and therefore more likely. But, as will 
be made clear later in this section, at T1 the strategic calculus is by necessity a far 
simpler matter, which is why, although strongly explanatory in many ways, DDM 
models are not effective in predicting real-world coalition outcomes22. 
This leads us to the third point; that players in the coalition game are subject to 
pure time preference. Again, as already noted, the concept of pure time preference 
refers to the process by which players will place a premium on payoffs accruing nearer 
in time and discount those that are more remote in time. The exact size of a discount 
rate is somewhat arbitrary, although cost benefit analyses for large capital-intensive or 
long-term investment projects will refer to various formal benchmarks in order to set 
such a rate23. In the economics literature there is a significant strand of thought that 
questions the ethics of such rates24 but what is important for the purposes of this 
article is that any kind of time discounting has a profound impact on the kind of cost-
benefit analysis that coalition players must make at T1. All things being equal, pure 
time preference has three effects. 
The first effect of pure time preference is that it shifts the balance between 
office seeking and policy-oriented payoffs with office-seeking payoffs having more 
immediate utility and being weighted by players accordingly. At the same time, 
however, coalition players do not work to a common benchmark and there will be 
variance in the degree of this shift between political parties; depending on the kind of 
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normative constraints discussed earlier. This is consistent with empirical work25 that 
operationalises formal modelling put forward by Sened26 and demonstrates that not 
only do German political parties display a mix of office seeking and policy-oriented 
payoffs but that the exact mix of these two kinds of payoff varies from party to party. 
The second effect is that, whilst policy-seeking as a whole is discounted to 
some degree, it also follows that the constellation of policy choices is impacted as well. 
As a result, policy choices that involve relatively long-term utility flows or those that 
incur immediate costs will be discounted against those that yield more immediate 
payoffs (the so-called ‘low hanging fruit’ such as tax cuts or rises and other forms of 
high profile or media-friendly measures). This point is not developed in this article but 
the Black-Yellow coalition’s direction of travel in policy terms is discussed elsewhere in 
this volume. 
The third effect is more relevant to this article: that all things being equal it 
follows that players will prefer to enter into coalition arrangements of which the 
parties they represent have had previous experience rather than choose potential 
coalitions that have not been road-tested, as it where, at least at the state level and 
preferably at the federal level. As discussed earlier, the process of coalition 
negotiations from T1 through T2 to T3 is costly, both in terms of information-
processing and also in terms of the organisational resources that are required. 
So, in the light of the arguments made above, this article deploys a synthetic 
framework, based on the following four assumptions: 
 First, that coalition formation is subject to two clear numerical formation 
criteria derived from established coalition models. The first is von Neumann 
and Morgenstern’s27 notion of the ‘minimal winner’, in which players will aim 
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to become members of a winning coalition that is the smallest feasible winner, 
given real-world constraints such as the indivisibility of formal party groups 
within the legislature. The second is Leiserson’s28 ‘bargaining proposition’, 
which argues that players will favour coalitions with the smallest number of 
partners within them, in order to reduce transaction and co-ordination costs. In 
this article, I use (1) a, ‘strict’ interpretation of the bargaining proposition, in 
which a minimal winner that conforms to the proposition trumps a surplus 
majority coalition that also does so; and (2) a ‘relaxed’ interpretation in which 
the minimal winner condition is relaxed. 
 Second, these numerical formation criteria are modified through the 
recognition of ideological adjacency. More specifically, I draw upon de Swaan’s 
29 notion of the minimal-connected winner with the smallest ideological range 
(MCW). In order to ensure a majority, the MCW must include the party that 
controls the median legislator: the Mparty. The party that controls the median 
legislator within the coalition is the MpartyK. Any party is Mparty and MpartyK 
is assumed to be decisive in determining the coalition’s potential composition, 
program, and stability. 
 Third, coalition players are not capable of complex multi-dimensional 
calculations at T1 and therefore the location of the Mparty and to a lesser 
extent the MpartyK along the Downsian left-right dimension originally used by 
de Swaan is highly significant. It is accepted that the restriction of the decision 
space to this single dimension does not reflect the true dimensionality of West 
European politics30 but there is a great deal of evidence that, despite the 
changes that have taken place within party systems over the last decades, left-
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right placement remains the best single predictor of real-world coalition 
outcomes31. 
 Fourth, all strategic decisions are subject to ‘pure time preference’ and players 
will prefer to enter into familiar coalition arrangements rather than choose 
unfamiliar potential coalitions. 
As will become apparent in our analysis of the 2009 coalition game, the first three 
assumptions are easy to read-off against the distribution of party weights and real-
world coalition outcome, whilst assumption four requires some contextual analysis 
and is a jumping off point for further research in the future. Nevertheless, having 
established our analytical framework, let us first move on examine the context of the 
German party system in 2009. 
 
THE GERMAN PARTY SYSTEM IN 2009 
Figure One presents the percentage shares of the second vote won by political parties 
in federal elections over the period 1949 to 2009. Taken in the round the data seems 
to demonstrate three phases of electoral support. First, the data indicates a 
concentration of voter preferences over the period 1949 to 1961, in which smaller 
parties such as the German Party and the German Reich Party (DRP) on the right and 
the German Communist Party (KPD) on the left fell away as popular support coalesced 
around the two Volksparteien and, to a far lesser extent, the FDP. The next phase, 
from around 1961 to 1983, was a period of centrist politics in which voters 
overwhelmingly supported the two Volksparteien, to the extent that their combined 
vote in the 1976 federal election was 91.2 per cent. The FDP continued to perform 
reasonably well, polling as much as 10.6 per cent in 1980 and - in the absence of other 
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small parties in the Bundestag - parlaying these modest levels of electoral support into 
de facto ‘kingmaker’ status between the two Volksparteien. At the same time, there 
were occasional ‘noises off’ from the NPD and the legal successor to the KPD32, the 
DKP, but no small party garnered enough electoral support to scale the Federal 
Republic’s 5 per cent barrier to entry into parliament. The third phase begins in 1983 
and, to all intents and purposes appears to have continued to the present day. It is of 
course characterised by the entry of two new political parties that were sufficiently 
popular to challenge what had appeared to be a stable political settlement and 
consolidate their respective positions within the German party system. The first new 
entrant, the Greens, entered the Bundestag following the 1983 federal election and 
this was followed by the entry of the PDS (now the Left Party) in 1990, as a result of 
German unification.  
Figure One about here 
The impact of these new entrants on the dynamics of the German party system was 
profound but was also to produce mixed fortunes for the established parties. 
Moreover, the full effects of these changes were not all immediately apparent in the 
1980s and 1990s and have had more profound effects in recent federal elections. 
Initially, the fact that both parties at least started off as flanking parties on the 
left-right dimension presented the SPD with a thorny strategic dilemma. Even before 
the arrival of the Greens, the SPD had been forced to develop a programmatic profile 
that was sufficiently centrist to appeal to the median voter whilst still possessing 
enough redistributive elements to maintain the support of its core blue-collar 
Stammwählerschaft33. The SPD’s subsequent ‘Janus-faced’ programmatic profile was 
already the source of intra-party tensions in the 1970s and the entry of the Greens in 
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1983 compounded the SPD’s difficulties because it introduced a new domain of 
contestation around post-materialist issues as well as stretching the ideological 
distance on the left—right axis along which the SPD had to compete34. The resulting 
‘red-green model’ of political co-operation35 between the SPD and Greens emerged in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s and stressed the selective emphasis of ‘new politics’ 
issues (such as environmental protection, group rights, and gender equality) around 
which the two parties could find common ground whilst initially ignoring many of the 
high politics issues, such as defence and security, that divided them36. However, just as 
the SPD began successfully to address the challenge of the Greens, the emergence of 
the PDS in the new German states re-emphasised the left-right dimension whilst also 
introducing a new territorial cleavage into political contestation37 that has only 
recently begun to resolve itself38. But these developments were not all bad news for 
the SPD. The entry of two left-of-centre parties into the Bundestag shifted the centre 
of ideological gravity of the German party system to the left and, in shape of the 
Greens, presented the SPD with at least one viable alternative coalition partner. By the 
mid 1990s this increase in the SPD’s potential coalition options was to enhance the 
SPD’s coalition power compared to a CDU/CSU that, although not facing an electoral 
challenge from the right equivalent to that faced by the SPD on the left, at this point in 
time only had the FDP or – in extremis – the SPD itself as a potential coalition partner. 
Figure Two about here 
The emergence of the Greens was also to rob the FDP of its kingmaker status and 
prompt speculation that the Greens themselves might be able to assume this role 
themselves. However, as well become apparent below, this last assumption was based 
on an underestimation of the longer term effects unleashed by the structural changes 
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discussed above. Figure Two presents levels of party system fragmentation over the 
period 1949 to 2009, measured via Herfindahl-Hirschman indices39 (or HHIs), which are 
calculated by squaring the seat share of each party and then summing the resulting 
scores)40. The figure demonstrates that what looks like three periods of party system 
development in Figure One could be interpreted as being actually four periods, in 
which the timeline since 1983 is made up of two phases. Thus, in a pattern similar to 
the electoral data in Figure One, Figure Two demonstrates that the period 1949 to 
around 1965 was characterised by rising HHI scores; from 0.2498 in 1949 to 0.4187 by 
1957. We then see a period of relative party system concentration from 1965 to 1987, 
in which HHIs easily outstripped the mean for the entire period (0.3695) and reached a 
high of 0.4457 (close to the nominal HHI score for an effective ‘two-party majoritarian’ 
system of around 0.5000) before dropping gently back in the 1970s and early 1980s. As 
would be expected, the arrival of the Greens has an impact on levels of fragmentation 
and, by 1987, the HHI score had declined to 0.3571. What is less expected is that 
German unification and the emergence of the PDS had less of an immediate impact 
than one might anticipate and HHIs for the five elections between 1987 and 2002 
trend just below the overall mean. What is noticeable, however, is that HHIs for the 
three elections since 2002 display a strong trend towards further fragmentation, with 
the HHI scores falling from 0.3568 in 2002 to 0.2907 in 2005 and finally 0.2520 in 2009. 
As already touched upon, some might argue that this period since 2002 
represents a fourth distinct period in the development of the German party system. 
However, I would argue that in historical terms, this is just the working through of the 
longer term effects unleashed by the changes that took place between 1983 and 1990. 
In effect the sudden increase in party system fragmentation that became visible from 
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2002 onwards was the result of what evolutionary and institutional economists call 
‘positive feedback’ effects41. Over the two decades from the early 1980s onwards, this 
positive feedback resonated between the ‘demand side’ of party politics, as it where, 
in which partisan dealignment and voters’ slow disenchantment with the established 
parties opened up enough viable political space for the Greens in particular42 and later 
the PDS43 to emerge, and the ‘supply side’, in which the persistence and consolidation 
of these new political competitors opened up new domains of political contestation, 
thus further eroding voters’ confidence in and support for the established parties. Over 
this period, these feedback effects transformed the German party system from the 
cosy triangular dynamic of the ‘Pappi model’44, through what was sometimes thought 
of as a ‘two-bloc’ system45, towards what Niedermayer has described as a ‘fluid party 
system’46 that more accurately reflects the complex society that Germany has 
become47. As will be discussed below, in such a configuration there was no longer a 
kingmaker; just two large, albeit diminished, Volksparteien and three smaller parties 
occupying niche positions within the political space defined by the dominant left-right 
and secondary libertarian-authoritarian axes48. It was under these conditions that the 
2009 coalition game was played. 
 
THE 2009 COALITION GAME 
Given that we have established that the increased fluidity of the German party system 
was unleashed by the process of change that was heralded by the emergence of the 
Greens in 1983 and of the PDS in 1990, I now use 1983 as the start of a timeline to 
analyse coalition formation in Germany; with an emphasis on the 2009 coalition 
process. 
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Figure Three about here 
Figure Three presents the number of minimal winning coalitions and coalitions with 
swing generated by the distribution of party weights after the eight federal elections 
that have taken place since 1983, including the 2009 outcome. These are purely 
numerical criteria but demonstrate that the scope for potential minimal winning 
coalitions has widened over the period, as has the number of coalitions in which the 
defection of one party transforms a winning coalition into a losing coalition, or vice 
versa. By definition, the total of such coalitions with swing includes all minimal winners 
and not just strict minimal winners but it will also include surplus majority coalitions. 
Thus the figure demonstrates a trend towards a more fluid configuration of coalition 
options in the German party system, despite the shortening of minimal winning 
options in 2009. But to what extent have the individual parties benefitted from these 
developments? 
Table One presents the normalised Banzhaf scores49, which measure potential 
voting power in terms of the coalitions that can form given the distribution of party 
weights in a given legislature, for the political parties following federal elections since 
1983. These scores include those for the 2009 election, which are in bold for ease of 
reference. The table demonstrates how the relative coalition power of the established 
parties has shifted since 1983, to the detriment of the FDP in particular. As already 
noted, the cosy dynamic of the old Pappi model allowed the FDP to exercise 
disproportionate power in relation to its seat share. However, as discussed above, the 
entry of the Greens into the Bundestag in 1983 heralded the end of the Pappi model 
and this is evident in the Banzhaf scores for the 1983 election, where the FDP and the 
Greens enjoyed the same Banzhaf score as the SPD (0.1667 out 1), with the CDU/CSU 
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clearly the formateur with a score of 0.5. The 1987 and 1994 federal elections 
produced identical scores but the emergence of the PDS at the first all-German federal 
in 1990 produced a new configuration, with the Greens becoming a dummy player and 
the PDS sharing the same score (0.1667) as the SPD and FDP. Yet again, the CDU/CSU 
remained the party with the most coalition power (0.5). Dummy status within the 
party system changed in 1994, when the PDS became the dummy and the Greens 
regained the level of coalition power it had enjoyed in the 1980s, whilst the CDU/CSU 
still remained dominant. This ongoing CDU/CSU dominance was brought to an end 
following the 1998 election, when the SPD gained a Banzhaf score of 0.5, the CDU/CSU 
dropped to 0.1667, the same score as the FDP and Greens, and the PDS remained the 
dummy. In 2002, both the PDS and FDP became dummies and the CDU/CSU, SPD, and 
Greens all shared a Banzhaf score of 0.3333. This was the only instance in which the 
Greens came close to enjoying the potential coalition power enjoyed by the FDP during 
the years of the Pappi model. In 2002 the situation changed yet again, with the two 
Volksparteien both enjoying Banzhaf scores of 0.5 and the three smaller parties all tied 
on 0.25. The scores following the 2009 federal elections are CDU/CSU 0.5, SPD 0.1667, 
FDP 0.1667, Greens 0, and Left Party 0.1667. 
Table One about here 
In numerical terms the overall pattern since 1983 appears to be one of trendless 
fluctuation, in which either the CDU/CSU (between 1983 and 1994 and after the 2009 
election) or the SPD (in 1998) had the highest Banzhaf score and the smaller parties’ 
fortunes shifted from election to election. However, there are actually two trends that 
are evident from the data. First, although the relative coalition power of the CDU/CSU 
and SPD has fluctuated since 1983, during this period both Volksparteien have enjoyed 
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Banzhaf PIs of up to 0.5. This is far higher than during the period of the Pappi model, 
when they both scored 0.3333, along with the FDP. Second, the FDP was reduced to 
dummy status following the 2002 election; something that did not happen during the 
years of the Pappi model. Dummy status also befell the Greens in 1990 and the PDS 
after the 1994, 1998 and 2002 elections. The impact of these two trends has been to 
produce an environment in which there is no established kingmaker (the Greens’ 
temporary status following the 2002 election was not maintained in 2005) and in 
which, on the basis of the experience of previous elections, the smaller parties are 
forced to operate under conditions of uncertainty about their future coalition power. 
At the same time, at least one of the two Volksparteien has been dominant after seven 
out of eight elections. This pattern, established since 1983, represents a far more 
asymmetrical relationship between the two Volksparteien and the smaller parties than 
had previously been the case, even when the seat share of the two Volksparteien was 
far higher than it is today. 
So, how did these developments play out in real-world politics? And how well 
do the four assumptions set out earlier in this article perform in focusing our analyses? 
Table Two sets out real world coalition outcomes following federal elections since 
1983 as well as the degree to which these outcomes conform to the first three 
assumptions of our theoretical framework. Again, the data for the 2009 federal 
election are in bold for ease of reference. 
Let us start with our first assumption; that coalition formation is subject to two 
clear numerical formation criteria derived from Neumann and Morgenstern’s notion of 
the minimal winner and Leiserson’s bargaining proposition. The outcome of the 2009 
coalition game does not conform to a strict interpretation of the minimal winner, 
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which would be a coalition made up of the CDU/CSU-Left Party, with a surplus majority 
of three. Both the CDU/CSU-Left Party option and the real-world Black-Yellow outcome 
conform to the bargaining proposition but, as Black-Green is trumped by a minimal 
winner, the strict interpretation of the bargaining proposition is not fulfilled. This result 
is not very surprising and not out of line with results from the previous seven elections, 
where there was only one strict minimal winner (the Black-Yellow coalition formed 
after the 1994 election) and five outcomes (Black-Yellow in 1983, 1990, and 1994; Red-
Green in 1998; the Grand Coalition in 2005) that fulfil the strict application of the 
bargaining proposition where the outcome is not trumped by a two-party minimal 
winner. On the other hand, all eight outcomes conform to the relaxed bargaining 
proposition, indicating that whilst ‘pure’ office-seeking alone cannot explain coalition 
outcomes in Germany, the desire to avoid the co-ordination costs associated with a 
multi-party coalition is a powerful factor in real—world coalition choices. 
We now move on to assumption two, that any numerical formation criteria are 
modified through the recognition of ideological adjacency and that players will aim to 
join the MCW with the smallest ideological range. Table Two demonstrates that all of 
the coalition outcomes since 1983 were ideologically adjacent and six out of eight 
outcomes where MCWs with the smallest ideological range (the exceptions being the 
Black-Yellow coalition formed after the 1983 election and the Grand Coalition formed 
after 2005). So once again, the 2009 outcome is broadly consistent with the general 
pattern and this pattern indicates that, whilst pure office-seeking is not a factor in 
German politics, if broad policy agreement can be achieved with potential coalition 
partners, then numerical formation criteria become important and parties will aim to 
join coalitions that avoid the generation of surplus majorities. 
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Our third assumption, that the location of the Mparty and to a lesser extent the 
MpartyK along left-right dimension is significant, is also confirmed by the data. Table 
Two demonstrates that the Mparty is included in all real-world coalition outcomes 
during the period. Moreover, in keeping with the shift in coalition power towards the 
two Volksparteien, although the FDP was Mparty at the start of the period, it lost its 
median status following the 1998 federal election. Since then one of the two 
Volksparteien has been Mparty (the SPD following the 1998, 2002, and 2005 elections, 
and the CDU/CSU following the 2009 elections). In addition, the relative size of the two 
Volksparteien means that the position of MpartyK has been combined with that of 
MpartyK on three occasions: the SPD in 1998 and 2002 and the CDU/CSU in 2009. 
Despite its many years as the kingmaker of the German party system, this theoretically 
decisive position was never achieved by the FDP and once again demonstrates the 
growing asymmetry in coalition power between the two Volksparteien and the smaller 
parties. 
Our fourth assumption, that all strategic decisions are subject to the players’ 
pure time preference, can only be more explored through a more contextual approach. 
It will be recalled that I argue that the impact of pure time preference on the coalition 
game is threefold: (1) that it will shift the balance between office seeking and policy-
oriented payoffs and that the degree of this shift varies between parties; (2) that policy 
choices that involve long-term utility flows or incur immediate costs will be discounted 
against those that yield more immediate payoffs; and (3) that players will prefer to 
enter into familiar coalition arrangements rather than choose unfamiliar potential 
coalitions. 
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The balance between office seeking and policy-oriented payoffs and the policy 
choices that underpinned the winning coalition are dealt with elsewhere in this 
volume. The third effect is more relevant to this article: that all things being equal it 
follows that players will prefer to enter into coalition arrangements of which the 
parties they represent have had previous experience rather than choose potential 
coalitions that have not been road-tested, as it where, at least at the state level and 
preferably at the federal level. As discussed when this framework was put forward, the 
process of coalition negotiations from T1 through T2 to T3 is costly, both in terms of 
information-processing and also in terms of the organisational resources that are 
required. As Table Two demonstrates, the real-world outcome of the Black-Yellow 
coalition fulfils many of our expectations, given the distribution of party weights 
following the 2009 federal election. However, Black-Yellow also possessed one clear 
advantage over other potential coalition options: it is, in historical terms, the default 
coalition arrangement at the federal level of German politics. After a period between 
1949 and 1956 in which the CDU/CDU and FDP governed in coalition with a number of 
smaller parties, a short-lived Black-Yellow prototype enjoyed office between 1961 and 
1962. There then followed a brief interregnum, followed by a longer period of Black-
Yellow government between 1962 and 1966 and, of course, from 1982 to 1998. This 
cumulative total of around 21 years in office was far higher than the 13 years enjoyed 
by the Social-Liberal coalitions of 1969 to 1982, the two Red-Green coalitions’ seven 
years in office between 1998 and 2005, or the seven years of Grand Coalitions 
between 1966 and 1969 and 2005 and 2009. As a result of this default status, it could 
be expected that, as formateur, the CDU/CSU’s prioritisation of Black-Yellow sharply 
reduced the information costs at T1 and the organisational costs associated with 
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delegation and monitoring, formalising and scoping, between T2 and T3. At the same 
time, however, this article does not assume that the formation of the Black-Yellow 
coalition was path-dependent. Clearly there was a greater and earlier degree of 
routinisation between T1 and T2 than would have been possible with some other 
coalition options but the strategic environment in which this Black-Yellow formed and 
its ideological composition was not the same as in, say, 1962 or 1982. 
This last point is of key interest, given the difficult birth and early life of the 
Black-Yellow coalition. The negotiations themselves were characterised by a striking 
amount of hostile press briefing50 and the first year of the coalition was characterised 
by high-degrees of inter- and intra-party conflict, to the extent that, by the following 
summer, German voters felt that Merkel had lost control of the Black-Yellow coalition 
and that the coalition’s days were numbered51. It is plausible to assume that the 
coalition’s troubles are in part a reflection of unrealistic expectations on the part of the 
players about the extent of its routinisation compared with other coalition options. 
Black-Yellow may have been the more familiar coalition choice but it would never be a 
return to the status quo ante before the changes of the 1980s and 1990s. The FDP was 
no longer kingmaker and could not expect to extract the degree of leverage it often 
enjoyed during the years of the Kohl governments. Moreover, even if Merkel had 
wanted to accommodate the FDP, she was unable to exert the same level of control 
over the CDU and its sister party that Kohl exercised and was therefore unable to 
silence conservative critics of the FDP on issues such as tax and foreign policy52. In 
addition, some of this criticism was, in itself, a reflection of a realisation amongst CDU 
and CSU politicians – including Merkel herself - that the FDP of 2010 was also a 
different kind of partner, more right wing in programmatic terms (and therefore less 
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‘available’ to alternative suitors such as the SPD) and sharper-toned in terms of its 
presentational and leadership style to the more centrist and emollient FDP of the 
Genscher years53. Exploring some of these points in more detail would be an 
interesting and potentially fruitful avenue for future research. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Although there certainly was an air of inevitability about the formation of the Black-
Yellow coalition, a re-examination of the context within which the formation of the 
coalition took place did throw light upon the broader logic of coalition formation in 
Germany and yielded useful insights into the development of the German party system 
and the changes it has undergone over the last thirty years. The article’s analysis of the 
German party system in 2009 grounds it in its historical context and demonstrates that 
the increasing fluidity of the German party system is part of the long term effects of 
the critical changes that took place between 1983 and the mid 1990s, with the entry 
into and consolidation within the party system of the Greens and the PDS (later the 
Left Party). These changes have shifted power relations within the coalition game away 
from the smaller parties, and in particular the FDP, and towards the two Volksparteien. 
This is, of course, something of a counter-intuitive point, given the overall decline in 
the Volkspartei vote and subsequent seat share but it is worth bearing in mind when 
assessing the specific circumstances of the formation of the Black-Yellow coalition in 
2009. 
Using a thick synthetic framework, derived from the established coalition 
literature, the article demonstrates that the logic behind Black-Yellow is consistent 
with the patterns evident from previous coalition games that have taken place since 
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1983 but that these patterns are a function of increased party system fragmentation, 
the erosion of the FDP’s kingmaker function, and the failure of either of the other 
smaller parties to take up the mantle of kingmaker for themselves. Within this context, 
coalition formation cannot be explained by pure office-seeking accounts but the desire 
to avoid unnecessary co-ordination costs is important. On the other hand, ideological 
adjacency and a desire to reduce ideological range to a minimum, is also very 
important and – if these conditions can be satisfied – it is then that numerical 
formation criteria become important. However the article argues that real-world 
strategic calculations are not as elegant or as sophisticated as some coalition models 
would have us believe and as a result, players are subject to a bounded rationality. This 
bounded rationality is in part due to the formal-institutional, informational and 
cognitive, as well as normative constraints upon the players in the coalition game. It is 
also due to pure time preference, which skews players’ utility functions in ways that 
can be modelled but not necessarily captured empirically. Nevertheless, it is argued 
that pure time preference will drive players to make small-c conservative choices of 
coalition option over untested alternatives. Ironically, in the case of the calculations 
that led to the formation of the Black-Yellow coalition in 2009, this desire for the tried 
and tested may have led players to over-estimate the degree of routinisation 
associated with Black-Yellow and underestimate the degree to which the dynamics of a 
coalition between the CDU/CSU and FDP, like those of the party system more 
generally, had fundamentally changed. 
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FIGURE TWO. PARTY SYSTEM FRAGMENTATION IN GERMANY, 1949-2009 
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FIGURE THREE. MINIMAL WINNING COALITIONS AND COALITIONS WITH SWING IN THE BUNDESTAG, 1983-2009 
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TABLE ONE. NORMALISED BANZHAF SCORES FOR POLITICAL PARTIES FOLLOWING FEDERAL ELECTIONS, 1983-2009 
Election Party 
 CDU/CSU SPD FDP Greens PDS/Left Party 
      
1983 0.5 0.1667 0.1667 0.1667 N/A 
1987 0.5 0.1667 0.1667 0.1667 N/A 
1990 0.5 0.1667 0.1667 0 0.1667 
1994 0.5 0.1667 0.1667 0.1667 0 
1998 0.1667 0.5 0.1667 0.1667 0 
2002 0.3333 0.3333 0 0.3333 0 
2005 0.5 0.5 0.25 0.25 0.25 
2009 0.5 0.1667 0.1667 0 0.1667 
Source: calculated from data sourced at http://www.wahlrecht.de  
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TABLE TWO. COALITION OUTCOMES FOLLOWING GERMAN FEDERAL ELECTIONS, 1983-2009 
Election:  06/03/83 25/01/87 02/12/90 16/10/94 27/09/98 22/09/02 18/09/05 27/09/09 
CDU/CSU  244 223 319 294 245 248 226 239 
SPD  193 186 239 252 298 251 222 146 
FDP  34 46 79 47 44 47 61 93 
Greens  27 42 8 49 47 55 51 68 
PDS/Left Party  --- --- 17 30 35 02 54 76 
Total Seats  498 497 662 672 669 603 614 622 
Decision rule  250 249 332 337 335 302 308 312 




Change  None None None None Total None Partial Partial 
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Assumption 3 ⊃Mparty FDP FDP FDP FDP SPD SPD SPD CDU 
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